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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 14436
GLORA WESTENSKOW,
Defendant and
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a divorce action brought by Appellant against
Respondent with Respondent filing a Counterclaim against Appellant,

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ronald
O. Hyde, presiding, awarded a Decree of Divorce in favor of
Respondent, awarded Respondent alimony and child support,
and equitably divided the marital estate in accordance with the
law and the evidence.
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-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial court's
Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not fully set forth
the facts established at the trial of this matter by leaving
out vital testimony having a bearing upon the issues on appeal.
The parties were married in December, 196 9 (R. 174).
At the time of the marriage, Appellant was an undergraduate at
the University of Utah and Respondent was a recent business
education graduate with a teaching certificate (R. 173-4) .
Appellant subsequently obtained a degree in marketing in 1972
(R. 119) . After graduation, Appellant was employed by
Burroughs Corporation as a marketing representative (R. 120).
During the time that Appellant was completing his
schooling, Respondent taught school and did secretarial work
contributing $13,021.00 to the marriage (R. 174-5) .

In addition,

she brought into the marriage $741.00 in her savings account,
a 1969 Camaro automobile with an equity value of $3,000.00, her
life insurance purchased by her parents with a cash value of
$584.00 and cashed in during the marriage, and a $2,000.00 gift
from Respondent's parents making a total financial contribution
into the marriage by Respondent of $19,346.00 (R. 175-76).
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-3Two children were born to the parties and were one
year and two years old at the time of trial (R. 179).

In 1974,

the year prior to the divorce trial, Appellant earned a salary
from Burroughs Corporation of $17,924.00 (R. 162). The parties
purchased a new home in 1972 for a sum of $28,600.00 (R. 180).
In the spring of 1975 Appellant learned that a girl
he knew in high school had recently been divorced (R. 146-47).
In March of 1975 Appellant filed the subject divorce proceedings
and advised Respondent that he did not love her (R. 1 and 184).
After the parties separated Respondent found a letter from
Appellant's high school sweetheart indicating "if you ever need
me here I am" (R. 183). Respondent testified at the trial that
she did not want the divorce (R. 178).
About two months prior to trial, Appellant intentionally
terminated his employment with Burroughs Corporation in August
of 1975, and incorporated his own business designated as Brute
of Utah, Incorporated (R. 120 and 123). The business consists
of a distributorship for an industrial cleaning company (R. 122).
The business started generating income in September, 1975 (R. 124).
Two new vans were leased to transport machines to be sold
and to be used by Appellant and one employee (R. 170). Two weeks
prior to the trial of this matter, Appellant purchased a 1976
Pontiac Grand Prix and testified that the purchase of this new
car would affect his ability to pay alimony and child support
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-4during the next five years (R. 15960).

At the time of trial,

Appellant projected his gross income for the next three months
at $800.00 per month with a net of $680.00 per month (Ex. E ) .
The residence of the parties was purchased in 1972
at a cost of $28,600.00 (R. 180). Its present value at the
time of trial was between $36,000.00 and $38,000.00 (R. 84 and
180). The equity in the house was approximately $8,300.00 after
deducting the first mortgage and 10 percent of the gross value
for selling costs (R. 84). Respondent was awarded the
residence subject to a $5,000.00 lien in favor of Appellant
payable in five years from the date of the Decree, marriage
of Respondent or at the time Respondent decided to sell the
residence, whichever came earlier (R. 95). The formula
followed by the Court was as requested by Appellant (R. 202).
Respondent had requested the Court to award her the residence
and all equity therein (Ex. 5 ) .
Respondent was further awarded all household furniture,
fixtures and appliances excepting certain items awarded to
Appellant which will hereafter be itemized (R. 95). Respondent
was further awarded the 1972 Jeep, one bicycle, sewing machine,
typewriter, piano and one-half of the stock of the parties in
Burroughs and McCulloch Oil (R. 95 and Ex. A ) . A one-half
interest of said stock would be worth approximately $1,6 30.87
(Ex. A) .
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-5Appellan1 recoivt-a ..-no bci" * "^

•••

*: • ';- -u

chairs, 1976 Pontiac, ono- half of th» shares of. stocK

in

Burroughs and McCulloch Oil, 1974 Gulf Stream boat, 1974
Yamaha motorcycle, one-sixth interest a-

*••• a-.-i'-s :

Wayne

County, IJtal i, all stock transferred to Appellant from his
grandmother , skis , go] f cli lbs , gi ins , archery set, camera,
tape deck, and $5,000., 00 lien against the residence of the
parties (R. 95). Appellant further was awarded commissions
due from 1 lis former employer i n the amount of $ 1 , 73] 00
together with all stock in Appellant

•.••*. business :•*. '^V,

Appellant f~; one-sixth interest >n 390 acres :•:
Wayne County was vaU-t-n i>\ ,*.t \n ii.-«{i *.
per acre (R. 150). \hi&

w^f-. a vested interest in Appellant

at the time of trial havinq been cor-^ovod to Appellant &%
special. Warranty Deed :u'

• l r- ana •-,>

Gifts of stock from Appellantfs grandmother and
vested in Appellant i L ^ ha

MM- . *' > i.i' .• • *- -•

One-half interest in one share East Mill Creek Water Company,
100 shares Dynapac, Inc., an undivided one-third interest
:i n Parker Mountain grazing privileges a- -. ••• r-. :•. vided
one-third interest in Producers Livestock Marketing
Association (R. 149, 150, 151, 170, 17 1.,. f.xs
Respondent was !eqn;« ••: i; -i^.-» i * •

6 -— 'j.
_:•-,

first mortgage on the residence in fhe approximate sum
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-6of $25,000.00 (R. 95 and 180). Respondent was further
required to pay the Beckstead Oil Company indebtedness in
the approximate sum of $300.00 to $400.00 (R. 95 and 182).
Appellant was required to pay all other outstanding
indebtedness which included payment of the second mortgage
on the residence in the sum of $3f000.00 and represented a
loan for an investment in the publication of a book on gold,
miscellaneous loans in the total sum of $930.00, and loans
connected with indebtedness incurred by Appellant in the
start of his new business (R. 95 f 149, Exs. B, C and 2 ) .
Appellant was further ordered to pay any indebtedness
owing to his grandmother, if any there be (R. 95 and Ex. B ) .
Respondent was awarded alimony in the sum of $75.00
per month for a period of six months and then to increase to
$100*00 per month for a period of six months and then to
increase to $150.00 per month for a period of 4 years and
then terminate (R. 95). This coincides with the time the youngest
child will start school.
Respondent was awarded child support in the sum
of $75.00 per month per child for a period of 3 months
after which it increased to $125.00 per month per child
to remain at that level until Appellant's income reached
$15,000.00 per year at which time it was to increase to
$150.00 per month per child.

In the event Appellant's

income reached $18,000.00 per year, child support was
set at $180.00 per month per child (R. 95).
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-7Each party was ordered to pay his and her own
attorney's fees (R. 95).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED BY THE
COURT AND THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
WAS WITHIN THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
It is with some reluctance that Respondent undertakes
the task of citing statutory law and case law in the subject case
because of the frequent appeals in divorce proceedings.

Therefore,

brevity will be the goal.
The legislature, in 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
has provided that "...the Court may make such orders in
relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance
of the parties and children, as may be equitable..."
In Wilson v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977, 5 Utah 2d 79,
involving a wife who was awarded a divorce from a husband who
was in love with another woman and wanted to marry her, and where
the court awarded her substantially all of the property possessed
by the parties, this court observed as follows:
"Reference to the facts of that case emphasizes
that no firm rule can be uniformly applied
in all divorce cases, and that each must be
determined upon the basis of the immediate
fact situation."
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-8"The more recent pronouncements of this
court, and the policy to which we adhere,
are to the effect that the trial judge has
considerable latitude of discretion in such
matters and that his judgment should not
be changed lightly, and in fact, not at
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse
of discretion."
A recent pronouncement of this court in McKean v.
McKean (1975), 544 P.2d 1238, this court observed as follows:
"The prior decisions of this court have not
enunciated a rule that the property of a
marriage must be divided by some formula nor
has the court ruled that the wife is entitled
to a fixed percentage of the husband's income
as alimony and support money. This court has
recognized the principle that the trial court
is entitled to a wide discretion in these
matters and that discretion is not interfered
with unless it appears from the record that
the trial court has abused this discretion."
As recently as April, 1976, in Leftwich v. Leftwich,
549 P.2d 447, this court held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate not in
accordance with the one-third, two-third formula.
In McBroom v. McBroom, 384 P.2d 961, 14 Utah 2d 393,
this court commented on the difficult task the court has in
trying to look into the future and determine the effect
that alternative courses of action will have on the lives,
happiness and well being of the children and observed as follows:
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-9"In the instant case, as is usual in child
custody cases, this court is burdened with the
dual task of determining not only the equity
of the property settlement, but also the more
important, yet uncertain and controversial
task of trying to look into the future and
determine the effect which each alternative
course of action will have on the lives,
happiness and well being of the children.11
This is undoubtedly what Judge Hyde had in mind in the
subject case when he responded to the suggestion by Appellant's
counsel that the estate should be divided down the middle (R. 201)
"THE COURT: The only problem with that proposition
is that it overlooks the interest of these
children. It is not a two-party matter. It
is four."
In the landmark case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d
1066, this court, in an opinion written by Justice Crockett, indicated
that in dividing property and awarding alimony in a divorce case,
factors to be considered are as follows:
1.

Social position.

2.

Standard of living.

3.

What each gave up for the marriage.

4.

What money or property each brought into the

5.

Ages of the parties.

6.

Physical and mental health.

7.

Relative ability.

8.

Training and education.

marriage,
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-109.

Income of the parties and property acquired.

10.

How property was acquired and efforts of each in

11.

Children to be reared, their ages, and obligations.

12.

Life expectancy.

13.

Extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care given.

14.

Present standards of living and needs of each

doing so.

including cost of living.
The onerous burden of the trial judge, as just described,
must have been felt by Justice Henroid in the case of Broadbent
v. Broadbent, 425 P.2d 784, 19 Utah 2d 48, when he observed:
"The veil of mathematical data woven by
both sides as to assets and income, effecti v e l y and with commendable common sense,
were pierced by a sabre wielded by a
practical, logical and humanly comprehending conclusion."
This, we contend, was the duty attempted and accomplished
by Judge Hyde in the subject case.

His first consideration was

to the children in keeping them in a home and providing them
with the bare necessities of life.
The judge's next concern was balancing the interests
of the husband and wife as best he could.
Alimony and child support started out at nominal
sums with the court considering that Appellant's business was
in its infancy.
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-11Appellan

hasi realized $600.00 gross in the first full

month of operation and anticipated that the next three months
would be $800.00 gross ner month.

The court further considered that

Appellant was able to afford a $175.00 per month apartment,
two new vans for his business and a 1976 Pontiac Grand Prix two
weeks before trial.
Appellant in his Answers to Interrogatories, signed
one month before trial, indicated that his monthly living
expenses were $839.00 (R. 46 and 163). Respondent testified
that the living expenses per month for her and the two
children were $600.00 (R. 178 and Ex. 4 ) .
The trial court, using a conservative and equitable
approach, provided for Appellant to pay only $225.00 for the
maintenance of Respondent and her two children for the first
three months following the trial.

For the next three months,

Appellant was ordered to pay the total sum of $325.00.

For

the following six months, Appellant was ordered to pay $350.00
and then the total sum of $400.00 for four years unless his
income reached $15,000.00.

It hardly seems that Appellant is

the victim of a harsh and unconscionable trial judge.
Appellant argues strenuously that graduated increases
for alimony and child support are improper.

Appellant argues

that a fixed sum should be set and later proceedings used
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-12if circumstances warrant.

It is true that this is one option

that the trial court has.

However, there is another option

available, i.e. the option of providing increases in alimony
and child support based upon increases in the income of
Appellant.

In either case, either party has the option of

petitioning the court to change the award if the circumstances
warrant such change.
This situation was faced by the Court of Appeals of
Oregon In the Matter of the Dissolution of the MARRIAGE OF
Patricia Ann TYERMAN (1975) 534 P.2d 998, where the husband
appealed from a decree awarding to the wife $150.00 per
month for support of each of the parties four children and
$500.00 per month for support of the wife for ten years and
then $300.00 per month indefinitely.

The court, in holding

that this formula was proper, observed as follows:
"We think the evidence is too indefinite
to be assured what husband's income will
be after two years in the service.
"If what counsel asserts proves to be so,
an adjustment probably should be made in
two years in the amount of the wife's
support. The indefiniteness of the
evidence appears to reflect as much an inability
to determine what the husband's pay will be
in two years as it does a failure to produce
available evidence. Hence a determination
of what the payments should be then may
be determined by future unpredictable events.
"We do not find that any of the court's
decree with reference to disposition of
property was improper. Therefore, we affirm
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-13the court's decree but observe that, if
the husband's income drops as his counsel
forecasts it will in two years, that will
be a change of circumstances which will
then justify a reappraisal of the amount of
support for the wife if proper motion is
made therefor."
Judge Hyde was faced with Appellant's new business
and the reasonably good prospects of substantial income in
the future and he chose a similar formula as the trial judge
did in the Oregon case.
In Berg v. Berg (1967), 434 P.2d 1, the Supreme
Court of Washington held similarly to the Oregon court and
held that an alimony award to the wife of $375.00 per month
until June 30, 1966, and thereafter of $200.00 per month
until July 1, 1971, was proper.
It is axiomatic that it is a common practice among
attorneys to provide for various levels of alimony and child
support as they relate to fluctuations in the husband's
earnings level.

This procedure provides flexibility and a safeguard

against future litigation when the earnings of the husband reach
higher levels and it is obvious that the needs of the wife
and children are at least the amount ordered or agreed upon.
The claim of Appellant that Respondent received 85
percent of the marital assets is surprising and inaccurate.
asked for a $5,000.00 lien on the residence of the parties
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-14and was granted this by the court with a limit in years when
said lien was to be paid.

No purpose would be served in

reiterating the division of the marital estate except to say
that each party paid his own attorney's fees, Respondent
received the household furniture and appliances and Appellant
received the new car, the new business, virtually all recreational
equipment including Gulf Stream boat and motorcycle, etc., and
the one-sixth interest in the 390 acres in Wayne County.
The bulk of the indebtedness Appellant assumed was
business indebtedness as shown by Exhibits B and C.

This is

particularly the case when one realizes that Respondent assumed
the first mortgage on the residence in the sum of $25,107.00.
Further, the trial court was not disposed to burden Respondent
with paying back the $3,000.00 invested in the publication
of a book on gold, or the questionable indebtedness to
Appellant's grandmother.
Appellant argues that he was put upon by the trial
court in that the court gave Respondent everything she asked
for including the payment of a debt owing to the Bank of Utah
which was not in the record.

On the contrary, the indebtedness

to the Bank of Utah was referred to in Appellant's testimony
at page 131 of the Record wherein Appellant testified in part
as follows:
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-15"A. Notes payable to banks is to the Bank of
Utah, a six month note that I acquired to make
the initial purchase of the business."
The court is further referred to Plaintiff's Answers
to Defendant's Interrogatories wherein in the answer to
Interrogatory No. 20 Appellant listed the Bank of Utah as
a creditor (R. 46).
Appellant urges that Respondent was awarded everything
she asked for which, of course, is not so.

Respondent

requested the court to award the residence of the parties
to her including all equity.

She also requested the court

to award child support in the sum of $200.00 per month per
child and alimony in the sum of $200.00 per month.

None of

these were granted by the court.
It is interesting to note that Appellant requests
the court to divide the marital estate on a 50 percent - 50
percent basis when none of the Exhibits he submitted to the
court contained the Wayne County property or the corporate
stock incident thereto.

While advocating that everything be

divided down the middle, Appellant was not willing to include
the Wayne County property as indicated at pages 203-4 of the Record
as follows:
"Q. Would you also be willing to give her
half of the Wayne County property when that
is sold?
"A.

No.

I have no idea what that is."
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-16A shortcut through this maze of data and argument
can be had by referring to the trial court's Memorandum Decision
(R. 66) and the trial court's Memorandum Decision Regarding
Plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration (R. 84). The trial
judge observed:

1.

Appellant had quit a job paying $18,000.00 a

year to go into business himself.
2.

That certain expenses could be placed into

Appellant's new business thereby minimizing his net income.
For example, a 1976 Pontiac to be paid by the business.
3.

That a 50-50 division of the property would make

sense except for the needs of the two minor children of tender
years.
4.

That Respondent is unable to immediately take

employment commensurate with her training in education.
5.

That Appellant's suggestions would immediately

place Respondent and the children at a poverty level to get
by the best way they could while Appellant goes on his way.
6.

That it was obvious under the circumstances that

the Respondent needed assistance by way of alimony.
7.

That in distributing the property, the children

were entitled to something better than some cheap apartment.
8.

That each party could pay their own attorney's

fees out of the stock that was equally divided.
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-179.

That Appellant, in his Request for Reconsideration,

did exactly as he did in court.

That he totally ignored the

interests and the needs of the two children.
10.

That the interests of the children come before

either of the parties.
11.

That the exhibits of Appellant are on the basis

that Respondent is a school teacher.

That the evidence before

the court was that Respondent was giving piano lessons with a
monthly income of approximately $200.00.
12.

That Appellant ignores the interests of the children

and would penalize them by dumping them in a nursery school.
That Respondent is to be commended for her attempts to grant
the children of tender years a parent's care in placing their
interests before her own pecuniary gain.
13.

That Appellant's position is unreasonable, i.e.

Appellant's Schedule (A) lists Appellant's food cost at exactly
the same figure as food costs for the Respondent and the two
children.

That the Appellant does the same thing with the clothing

cost.
14.

That the court valued the home at $37,000.00 and

found an equity of $8,300.00 after deducting the first mortgage
and a 10 percent factor for selling costs.
15.

That considering Appellant's lien of $5,000.00,

Respondent received $3,300.00 and not the figure of $9,500.00
as set out in Appellant's Schedule (G).
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-1816.

That the $3,000.00 second mortgage on the

residence was a bad investment and Appellant should suffer
the loss.
17.

That one of the reasons Appellant received a

$5,000.00 lien on the residence was the obligation to Appellant's
grandmother which the court questions will ever even be paid.
18.

That Appellant's loss to determine how the court

reached the result it did will probably always remain so long
as Appellant interprets the action as involving only two parties.
19.

That Respondent and her two children have been

reduced to a proverty level by this divorce.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the
trial court in the awarding of alimony and child support and
the division of the marital estate was well within the evidence
and the applicable legal principles and that the same should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD H. THORNLEY
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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